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This article examines Turkey‟s veil ban policy, which has been in place since the 
1980s. The dilemma is whether Muslim-veil bans impinge on the rights of expression and 
religion at both national and international levels or, whether states may legally justify a 
ban on the basis of secularism and women‟s rights.   Even though the idea of freedom 
“from religion” in Turkey has been closely linked to the European notion of secularism 
during most of Turkey‟s  republican history, more recently, secularism and veil bans in 
Turkey and in the West have been construed quite distinctly. This shows an increasing 
gap between European and Turkey‟s politics and values.   
 
Keywords: Human rights, Muslim-veils, secularism, Turkey, women‟s rights.  
 
Introduction 
Scholars and practitioners of international law have recognized the obstacles that 
human rights must overcome to conflate individual and collective rights into a cohesive 
system.  More specifically, the collective nature of freedom of religion has been 
problematic (Chirkin 2007). Religious identity is acquired within communities, but the 
post-World War II international human rights regime initially placed greater importance 
on individuals as the locus of human rights.  Moreover, the universality of basic 
individual human rights proclaimed in treaties and declarations has also been challenged 
by religious practices and regional conventions.  
This article examines how freedom of religion is interpreted at state and 
international levels, using the example of Turkey‟s veil ban.  The issue here is whether 
Muslim-veil bans impinge on the rights of freedom of expression and religion, or whether 
states may legally justify a ban on the basis of secularism and women‟s rights. The 
requirement to wear Muslim veils as an expression of religious identity is in itself highly 
controversial. Some Muslim theologians argue that the Qur‟an requires women to be 
modest and not to provoke men by their appearance, and that modesty does not always 
translate into covering one‟s head, full-body and face. This explains why there is such a 
great variation in Muslim veiling even among Muslim conservatives around the world.  
Although it is outside the scope of this work to discuss whether veiling is a requirement 
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under Islamic law, the fact that there is such a debate is noteworthy because it underlines 
different ways to interpret and reinforce what both sides of the debate claim to be their 
struggle for freedom of religion. To illustrate these controversies, this article examines 
the case of Leyla Şahin, a medical student at the University of Istanbul, who went to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to challenge a veil ban in Istanbul‟s 
university. As a Muslim woman, she claimed that the university policy-and Turkish laws-
violated her rights of freedom of expression and religion.
1
   
The first section of this article examines general current trends on the protection 
of basic human rights and analyzes the universality of human rights and its problems, 
using as appropriate examples for this case, the European and Arab human rights 
agreements. A second section examines the historical evolution of secularism in Turkey 
since its origins during the 1920s until recent years and illustrates how this concept has 
been vaguely defined by political authorities.  This has given court decisions ample room 
to construe the meaning of secularism and veil bans in Turkey. The third and last section 
analyzes the interpretation of Turkey‟s veil bans at the international (European) level and 
examines European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions on Turkey‟s veil bans, 
including the case of university student Leyla Sahin.   This discussion is significant 
because even though the idea of secularism and freedom “from religion” had been closely 
identified with the European notion of secularism since Turkey became a republic, more 
recently, policies of secularism and veil bans in Turkey, as compared to Western Europe, 
are being construed quite distinctly.  
 
 Human Rights and the Problem of Universality 
The end of the cold war was seen to be the beginning of "a new world order," 
when the divide between western capitalist and eastern communist societies would no 
longer exist. Unquestionably, east vs. west conceptions of human rights have come closer 
together, yet the international community has also entered a period of remarkable global 
transition. The resulting confluence of peoples and cultures in an increasingly borderless 
multicultural world has created tension and conflict. According to Ayton-Shenker (2011) 
“there is an understandable urge to return to old conventions, traditional cultures, 
fundamental values, and the familiar, seemingly secure, sense of one's identity. Without a 
secure sense of identity amidst the turmoil of transition, people may resort to 
isolationism, ethnocentrism and intolerance.” This is why human rights should be 
interpreted as a universal body of law, yet also taking into consideration the rights of 
cultural minorities. 
In the strict sense of the term, universal human rights do not represent a given 
tradition nor are they oriented towards one culture to the exclusion of others. They do not 
impose one cultural standard, but they presuppose a minimum protection of rights 
necessary for human dignity. As a legal standard adopted through the United Nations and 
by most members of the international community, universal human rights are the result of 
a hard-won consensus to achieve and advance a common standard and an international 
system of law to protect human dignity. 
Through several international agreements sponsored by the United Nations, the 
principle of universality of human rights has been clearly accepted and recognized in 
numerous international agreements. Human rights are emphasized among the purposes of 
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all without distinction.” Moreover, alongside the UN Human Rights system, regional 
human rights agreements have also expressly recognized individual and collective rights.  
  At the opposite extreme of universality is cultural relativism.  Cultural relativism 
is the assertion that individual and group-level traditions, far from being universal, vary 
according to different cultural perspectives, and absence of a “common denominator” of 
values ensues. Some would apply this relativism to the interpretation and application of 
human rights in view of different cultural, ethnic and religious traditions.  Indeed, 
whereas most members of the international community have signed and ratified the major 
human rights conventions, some “relativist” undertones are still present;  particularly 
relevant for this paper are those regarding “religious rights.”  For the purpose of this 
work, we will examine European human rights agreements and human rights treaties 
adopted by Muslim countries. 
 
 European Human Rights 
Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms regulates freedom of religion. In addition, like UN documents, 
the European convention emphasizes the universal and indivisible nature of human rights 
and remains neutral regarding religion.  Regarding Muslim veils, the convention has 
several legal provisions that may justify the right to wear veils, most notably articles 8 
and 9 on freedom of conscience, expression, and religion. However, similarly to 
international agreements, Articles 8 and 9 also allow some limitations to those rights 
“when they are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (European Convention of Human 
Rights).  
Concerning collective human rights, European states have adopted several 
agreements, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, which among other principles advocates the “preservation and development 
of culture and identity of national minorities.” In addition, the European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages, and the OSCE Copenhagen Document of 1990 are 
directed to the protection of minorities. Yet, the increasing number of countries banning 
veils in Western Europe may be seen, at least partly, as policies that de-emphasize the 





Islamic Human Rights   
  Among the various components of freedom of religion, the right to change 
religions and the right not to be religious have been problematic for many countries with 
a majority of Muslim populations, hereinafter called “Muslim countries,” 3 partially 
because of their historical encounters with European colonization and Christian 
missionaries.  As an alternative to the Western human rights system, the Islamic Council, 
a private Islamic organization based in London, adopted a Universal Islamic Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1987.  Three years later, official representatives of 45 Muslim 
countries adopted the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam and in 1994 Arab 
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In contrast to the UN and European human rights agreements, human rights 
documents adopted by Muslim countries or Islamic organizations make explicit 
references to God, Islamic law, and Shari‟a. These allusions only raise questions as to 
whether the agreements also protect individuals who are not members of a religious 
group, or do not agree with the dominant interpretation of Islam. The 1981 Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights
4
 emphasizes the supremacy of Islamic law; it advances the 
principles of non-discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, origin and language, but 
does not mention religion. Freedom of religion is guaranteed under Articles 10 and 13. 
Article 10 establishes the “Rights of Minorities” and stipulates that “a) The Qur'anic 
principle of „no compulsory religion‟ shall govern the religious rights of non-Muslim 
minorities (which means a protection from forced religious conversions); b) In a Muslim 
country religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in their civil and family 
matters according to Islamic Law or by their own laws.” Article 13 establishes the “Right 
to Freedom of Religion” and states that “Every person has the right to freedom of 
conscience and worship in accordance with his/her religious beliefs.” In contrast to 
international and European human rights instruments, the document does not foresee a 
right not to believe.   
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights
5
 also emphasized its conformity with 
Islamic Shari‟a. Article 10, the only provision regarding religious identity, states that 
“Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of 
pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change his 
religion to another religion or to atheism.”  The 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights6 
refers to UDHR, ICCPR and Cairo Declaration on Human Rights but it also claims to 
derive its legitimacy from Islamic Shari‟a. Regarding freedom of religion, Article 26 
provides “freedom of beliefs, thought and opinion;” and Article 27 guarantees the free 
exercise of religion unless restricted “by law.” In addition, Article 37 guarantees 
minorities a right “to enjoy their culture or to follow the teachings of their religions.”  
The 2004 reforms of the Arab Charter
7
 continue its references to Islamic Shari‟a. Article 
30 is devoted specifically to freedom of religion and contains provisions similar to the 




The fact that Arab human rights instruments are explicitly based on Islamic 
Shari‟a raises numerous concerns, particularly from the perspective of women and 
minority rights. Although there has been an increasing rise in Islamic feminism and 
efforts to find sources for gender equality within Islamic law have been shown by 
Islamist scholars, they have not been influential in shaping the application of Islamic 
Shari‟a, which in most cases has resulted in discriminatory practices against women.  
From the perspective of Muslim veil bans in Turkey, both the European and the Islamic 
human rights traditions have played a significant role in shaping these policies.  As it will 
be examined in the next sub-sections and despite its Muslim tradition, Turkey may be 
categorized as a “hybrid” case, where both secularism and traditional Islamic roots have 
been incorporated into its constitutional and institutional systems.  However, secularism 
has been a politically and judicially constructed policy, given the ambiguous 
characterization of this term by Turkey‟s laws and regulations. 
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The case of Turkey is particularly interesting for numerous reasons. Turkey is one 
of the largest predominantly “Muslim” countries in the world, but it is also a member of 
the European Human Rights Committee and recognizes the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights to interpret domestic legislation in cases of alleged   human rights 
violations.  In addition, Turkey has sought membership in the European Union since the 
1980s, providing a clear interest for Turkey to join the “West.” Finally, Turks are one of 
the largest Muslim immigrant communities in Europe and have important Diasporas 
throughout Western Europe. Yet, Muslims are a socially constructed category, and what 
it means to be Muslim in Turkey as in other Muslim countries is subject to debate and 
interpretation as seen below.  
Secularism in Turkey was introduced by one of the Ataturk‟s six arrows and was 
incorporated into the Turkish Constitution in 1928, when Islam as the state religion was 
excluded from the Constitution.
 9
  In subsequent decades, the Turkish government 
responded to the growing opposition of Islamic forces by harassing the official Islamic 
opposition on the one hand but making concessions with informal Islamic groups on the 
other. For example, in March 1924, the Diyanet (Diyanet Işeri Başkanlığı) or Directorate 
of Religious Affairs was established by Ataturk as a governmental institution with the 
purpose of creating an official, government-controlled form of Islam. Since the late 
1940s, the Republican People‟s Party (RPP), Ataturk‟s political party, which ruled with 
no opposition in the 1920s, 1930s and most of the 1940s, began to sponsor pilgrimages to 
Mecca and open Sufi convents.  In addition, Sunni Islam teachings spread to elementary 
schools, and imam-hatip schools (private training secondary-level schools for Sunni 
Muslim clergy) were created.  
The RPP took rather radical measures to undermine the power of Islamic religious 
leaders who had been influential in shaping regional politics prior to the establishment of 
the Republic. Despite that, unpopular authoritarian politics required some flexibility 
towards Islamic opposition forces that were reflected in ambiguous policies enacted by 
the government.  
 
Political instability from 1950s to 1970s 
Despite the efforts of the RPP to gain the support of pious Muslim voters, 
Turkey‟s Democratic Party which appealed to religious sentiments managed to get a 
significant percentage of parliamentary seats during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s and allowed 
this party  to dominate Turkey‟s politics during these three decades. The Democratic 
Party enhanced the policy of co-opting Islamist forces. They introduced teachings of 
religion (Sunni Islam) as an elective course in schools, permitted the imam-hatips to 
function, enacted policies beneficial to Muslim sects (tariqas), and built new Sunni 
mosques.   
By the late 1950s, the government also allowed a call for prayer to be made in 
Arabic (which under the RPP rule had to be made both in Turkish and Arabic); the 
Institute of Islamic Studies (which had been closed during the RPP rule) was reopened; 
and Koranic readings were broadcasted on radio.  As a result, under the rule of the DP, 
Turkey witnessed increasing religious fervor. At the same time, Turkey witnessed violent 
clashes between secularist and Islamist political forces that led to military coups in 1960 




Journal of International Women‟s Studies Vol 13 #3 July 2012 
Post-coup Turkish politics witnessed raising popularity of political forces using 
Islamist rhetoric and expansion of Sunni Islam in the public educational system. Despite 
renewed violent clashes between secularists and Islamists, police forces failed to 
intervene, allowing right-wing organizations and political parties, such as the increasingly 
radical Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to succeed.  MHP pioneered the idea of a 
“Turkish-Islamic synthesis” which combined Turkish descent and language with Sunni 
Islam as a major defining feature of Turkish identity.   
 In terms of secularism, Diyanet continued to use taxpayers‟ money to promote 
state-controlled Islam. More important, in 1972 Turkish Law required all its citizens to 
record their religious identity. As discussed later in the article, decisions of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court in favor of this policy demonstrate that this was not perceived as 
contradicting Turkey‟s  secularism  because it did not imply direct discrimination of 
religious rights.  
  
 A Delicate Balance? Secularism and Political Islam since the 1980s 
 In the name of re-establishing pubic order, the military intervened again in 1980, 
but also used Islamic rhetoric (Turkish-Islamic synthesis) to appease the opposition.  
Interestingly enough, a couple of months after the coup, the High Council for Religious 
Affairs (decision 77) stated that it was a duty for Muslim women who attended the imam-
hatip schools (religious schools) to cover their heads with a Muslim veil.  In addition, 
under military rule, teaching religion (exclusively Sunni Islam) in the schools was made 
mandatory, even when it was against the will of the parents.  
Furthermore, the military allowed Saudi Arabia to sponsor the World Islamic 
League to finance Turkish religious teachers, to build a mosque in the Turkish 
parliament, and to establish Islamic centers in various universities. The military also 
allowed some Islamic banks and financial organizations to establish their branches in 
Turkey. These activities further contributed to the empowerment of Islamic groups in 
Turkey.  Appointees for important positions were chosen from conservative groups, 
including the Muslim brotherhood.  
It is noteworthy that the same conservative-military forces that promoted Sunni 
Islam through their policies also introduced a ban on Muslim veiling in public spaces. 
Under an administrative regulation on “Employees‟ Clothing working in Public 
organizations and Institutions” veiling was restricted. Thus, all female students in 
educational institutions of any level (schools and universities) were mandated to uncover 
their heads. Later that year, the ban was expanded to all female civil servants. The same 
law also regulated personal appearance for men and women‟s hair-style, dress style, and 
length of nails and skirts, although not all regulations were enforced.  In addition, the 
Higher Education Council (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK) introduced a disciplinary 
penalty for those who deviated from established dress codes.   Perhaps Turkey‟s military 
wanted to please both secular and religious camps to prevent violent clashes between 
them. However, and possibly as a result of such policies, the 1980s witnessed further 
empowerment of the informal male-dominated Islamist groups; described in the literature 
as a rise of political Islam in Turkey.  
Post-coup multi-party politics elected new Islamic political parties to Parliament 
that continued through the 1990s.  Yet, in 1997 Turkish Armed Forces demanded that 
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undermine the strength of Islamic political forces.  These reforms included increasing 
mandatory public schooling from five to eight years,
10
 government‟s oversight of 
religious orders, ending the recruitment of party members for governmental jobs, fully 




The Chief of Staff established the “Western Working Group” to monitor the 
activities of Islamic “fundamentalist” groups. It also organized a series of briefings for 
bureaucrats, academicians, journalists, lawyers, and judges about Islamist activities in 
Turkey.  As a result, the military closed corporations, newspapers, national and local 
television stations, magazines, and  student fraternities suspected of “subversive Islamic 
activities.” In addition, the army formulated a new “concept of national security” which 
declared Islamic movements to be the most important threats to the Turkish Republic.  
Yet, Islamic forces have continued to influence Turkish politics until today. 
Former  Islamic Virtue Party (VP)-later banned by the Constitutional Court for its radical 
views- was split into two political parties both of which are still functioning in Turkey 
today. Its traditionalist or conservative wing formed the Felicity Party (Selamet Partisi), 
SP, and the moderate wing formed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, JDP), which came to power in 2002 and it is still Turkey‟s ruling party.  
Despite its relatively moderate views, one of the most significant JPD policies has been 
its re-interpretation of Turkey‟s secularism.  For example, the Turkish parliament has 
allowed the return to school of thousands of students who have been previously expelled 
from universities for wearing Muslim veils.  As discussed in the following sub-sections, 
in the case of Leyla Şahin, the JDP-controlled government opposed the ECHR decision in 
support of Turkey‟s veil ban and successfully challenged the ban  in 2010. 
 
The Law and its Interpretation: Veil Bans and the Courts 
In Turkey, veiling is more often identified with the Muslim-Sunni tradition as 
some non-Sunni Muslim groups (such as Alevis) do not require women to wear veils 
(Dressler 2008). In recent years, the battle to lift Turkey‟s decades old headscarf  ban has 
become one of the prominent symbols of conservative politics and as such, the wives of 
legislators from the ruling  JDP are increasingly  veiled and the number of veiled women 
in general has been increasing.   
Secularism is mentioned several times in the Turkish Constitution,
12
 but it is 
never clearly defined. For example, the Constitution‟s Preamble states that 
 
“no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national 
interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its 
state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, 
principles, reforms and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the 
principle of secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred 
religious feelings in state affairs and politics.
13“ 
 
 Article 24 of Turkey‟s Constitution (last amended in October 2001) provides for “freedom of 
conscience, religious beliefs and conviction;” and guarantees both the freedom to practice 
religion and to be protected from the forceful participation in religion, yet it also provides for 
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law regulating these constitutional provisions and leaves their interpretation to judicial and 
administrative authorities.    
Constitutional provisions regarding freedom of religion have contradictory 
elements. The state guarantees the right to practice freely any religion but it also limits 
such freedom of religion not only when it is exercised with the intent “of personal or 
political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, 
political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets,” but also when it is “exercised 
with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation”  
or when exercised, it endangers the “democratic and secular order of the Turkish 
Republic based upon human rights” (Article 14).   The state also created the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs and thus allowed some Muslim clerics to be salaried employees of 
the government, financed the construction of mosques, and published religious literature 
and Islam-teaching schools, in direct transgression to the concept of secularism.  
Turkey‟s courts have interpreted the principle of secularism with ample 
ambiguities, given the broad constitutional terms and a lack of legal regulations. In 1971, 
one of the opposition political parties filed a case with the Turkish Constitutional Court 
claiming that having a Directorate of Religious Affairs with government employees 
contradicted the constitutional principle of secularism, because religion should be 
separate from the state and the state could not be involved in spreading religious 
knowledge. The Court stated that from the legal point of view, secularism means that 
religion and state are separate but, unlike Western Christian countries, in Turkey the state 
regulates this relationship.  Thus, according to this interpretation secularism in Turkey 
means that religion should never be sovereign and independent from state control. In 
other words, Turkish citizens are constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion, but 
when religion crosses the boundaries of the individual and impacts public order and 
security, certain limitations on the freedom of religion are acceptable to prevent its 
“misuse.” 14 
  A year  after this decision, Turkey adopted a Population Law (Nufus Kanunu) 
that required all Turkish citizens to identify themselves by their religion (Article 43) on 
their identity cards. The Constitutional Court interpreted this requirement several times 
and in all cases it upheld its constitutionality.  For example, a Turkish citizen of the Bahai 
faith argued against article 43 of the Population Law because he was not allowed to 
declare and record “Bahai” (a non-recognized religion in Turkey) on his identity card. In 
its 1986 decision, the court asserted that the Turkish Constitution guarantees freedom of 
religion to individuals of all religions, whether established or not.  It also stated that 
limitations and restrictions on freedom of religion are justifiable when religion influences 
social life, public order and security.  Again, ten years later, the Council of State refused 
to record an individual‟s conversion to “Sky God” (Tengri Root) because this was not a 
recognized religion in Turkey. Yet, the court asserted that freedom of religion included a 
freedom to change one‟s religion. Hence a person who converted from Islam to another 
religion had a right to have his or her religion recognized on identity cards.  
The Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of veil bans on several 
occasions.  In a 1998 decision, the Court claimed that veil bans were based on secularism 
because when religion is expressed in public spaces, including public schools, it prevents 
people belonging to different faiths from cooperating with each other.  A few years later, 
the court upheld veil bans claiming that allowing the display of religious symbols in 
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minorities, incite radicalism among students, and disrupt public order.  In sum, the 
Constitutional Court claimed that Muslim veils threatened Turkey‟s secular roots.15 
During the1999 national parliamentary elections, two women, Merve Kavakci 
from the radical Islamist Virtue Party and Nesrin Ünal, from the Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetci Hareket Partisi), were elected to the legislature for the first time in the 
country‟s history. Both women wore veils, despite the fact that veiled women were not 
allowed to seat in parliament.    Because of this policy, Ünal removed her veil before 
claiming her seat in parliament and asserted that the interest of the nation came before her 
individual freedom, but Kavakci defied the secular policy and still wore a veil. She was 
applauded by VP deputies but rejected by other parliamentarians, the prime minister and 
Turkey‟s president. More drastic measures ensued, including forced resignation from her 
position and revocation of her Turkish citizenship. In an appeal to the ECHR, the 
European Court found that revoking Kavakci‟s citizenship for wearing a veil violated the 
Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights which on Article 3, guarantees 
that free elections should take place “under conditions which will ensure … free 
expression.”16 
As discussed in previous pages, since the JDP‟s ascent to power the meaning of 
“secularism” and veil bans have become more relaxed. The party‟s 2006 Program of 
Development of Democratization defined religion “as one of the most important 
institutions of humanity, and laicism [secularism] as unavoidable condition of 
democracy, and as a guarantee of freedom of religion and consciousness.” It emphasized 
that secularism should be understood as a freedom to practice religion, to express one‟s 
beliefs, and live according to them. On the other hand, the instruction of religion is “a 
requirement of the principle of secularism” according to the party, and the state does not 
have the right to intervene in matters of “family, school, property, religion, and 
morality.
17
   
 This interpretation of freedom of religion differs from the individualist approach 
of the UN and the EU and it is more similar to the approach adopted by Islamic human 
rights documents.  Although the JDP does not explicitly refer to Islamic law (Sharia), its 
approach to freedom of religion as a freedom to reassert one‟s religion rather than a 
freedom “from religion” shows significant differences from previous interpretations of 
Turkey‟s secularism.  It is evident that the political nature of both secularism and 
religious freedoms in Turkey and its judicial interpretations have evolved and changed 
with a stronger presence of Islamist political parties and of their views in more recent 
court decisions.   
 
The ECHR: Veil Bans at the International Level 
From international and regional perspectives, previous ECHR interpretations of 
veil bans are politically significant, given the fact that an increasing number of European 
countries have adopted veil bans recently.  Though more restrictive, veil-ban legislation 
in France, Belgium, and other Western European countries sub-nationally will bring new 
legal challenges to the region.  For Turkey, the issue of veil bans at a European court had 
political ramifications.   Turkey‟s petition to join the EU had been postponed indefinitely 
for, among other reasons, not complying with EU standards on human rights.  However, 
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maintaining secularism in public places is not only legal under European law but also in 
the best interest of a religiously and ethnically divided country like Turkey.   
One of the most notorious instances where Turkey‟s veil ban was challenged in an 
international court was the case of Leyla Şahin.  A university student raised by a 
conservative Turkish family in which women were traditionally veiled, Şahin was not 
allowed to register and attend classes or exams at the University of Istanbul because she 
wore an Islamic veil. Şahin was not the first veiled student who had been banned from 
attending a public university because of the veil, but she was the first one to take her case 
to the ECHR in 1998 and to juxtapose her interpretation of freedom of religion with the 
dominant view of Turkish secularism at the time. In addition, this case took place during 
the time when Turkey and the EU‟s relations were facing some difficulties.  Thus, 
Sahin‟s case was also political as it presented a challenge against Turkey‟s human rights 
record. 
Veil bans in public universities were common in Turkey.  They were based on the 
constitutional principle of secularism, in accordance to university regulations, and 
founded on decisions of Turkey‟s Council of Higher Education, which banned women 
from wearing Islamic veils in all public educational institutions.   According to university 
regulations:    
 
“Students whose „heads are covered‟ (who wear the Islamic headscarf) and 
students (including overseas students) with beards must not be admitted to 
lectures, courses or tutorials. Consequently, the name and number of any 
student with a beard or wearing the Islamic headscarf must not be added to the 
lists of registered students.” 18 
 
  Based on the principles of freedom of religion and expression, Şahin appealed to 
the Istanbul Administrative Court, claiming that university policies regarding headscarves 
infringed on her rights guaranteed by Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. The Administrative Court dismissed the application, holding that a 
university vice chancellor, as the executive organ of the university, had power to regulate 
students‟ dress-code for the purposes of maintaining order as long as that regulatory 
power was exercised in accordance with relevant legislation and judgments of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court.   Referring to the settled 
case-law of those courts, the Administrative Court held that neither the regulations at 
issue, nor the measures taken against the applicant could be considered unlawful.  Şahin 
first appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, but with a decision against her and as 
last judicial resort, she went to the ECHR.  
With several changes in Turkey‟s political landscape, the 2005 ECHR decision 
came at a time when secularism and veil bans in Turkey were being re-interpreted.  
Nevertheless, the ECHR decision was more closely identified with the still dominant 
judicial interpretation of Turkish secularism.  Indeed, in its final decision, the ECHR 
asserted that even though university regulations restricting Şahin‟s right to wear a veil 
had “interfered with the applicant‟s right to manifest her religion,” this interference was 
prescribed by law and had a legitimate purpose according to the second paragraph of 
Article 9 of the Convention. It was justified in principle and proportionate to the aims 
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society.” The ban was justified based on the European interpretation of secularism 
(laïcité) on the grounds that “in democratic societies, in which several religions coexist, it 
may be necessary to place restrictions on the freedoms to manifest one‟s religion or belief 
in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone‟s beliefs 
are respected.” 19   Hence, Turkey had a right to place restrictions on Muslim veils to 
protect “the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety.”  20   
 The ECHR concluded that “in a country like Turkey, where the great majority of 
the population belongs to a particular religion, measures taken in universities to prevent 
certain  religious movements from controlling the milieu was justifiable under Article 9 § 
2 of the Convention.” 21   Thus, the ECHR decision in this case followed previous 
analogous decisions and construed the meaning of “secularism” similarly to earlier 
interpretations of Turkish authorities and domestic courts.  In Şahin‟s case, with a 
decision against her appeal, she decided to finish her medical studies at the University of 
Vienna where she was allowed to wear a veil. 
Two other decisions on Muslim veil bans were interpreted very similarly by the 
ECHR. The applicants entered their cases on the basis of Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In the first case, a Turkish female student Senay 
Karaduman was not allowed to obtain her university diploma because she was wearing a 
Muslim veil in a picture she submitted and required by the university.   Ruling against 
Karaduman, the ECHR claimed that university regulations might be different from 
religious regulations and that the university diploma is not a document that verified 
religious (or any other cultural) identity.
22
  In the second case, Lucia Dahlab, a Swiss 
female teacher converted to Islam was required to uncover her head while teaching.  
After appealing to the ECHR, the court emphasized the symbolic importance of wearing 
hijabs in an otherwise “neutral” educational environment and rejected Dahlab‟s appeal.23 
After Şahin, the court heard the case of Hasan Zengin, a Turkish Alevi citizen, 
who on behalf of his daughter appealed to the ECHR arguing that compulsory Sunni 
classes of religion and teachings on Turkish morals and culture were violating his 
daughter‟s freedom of religion.  The ECHR concluded that Turkey did indeed breach a 
requirement of objectivity and pluralism with respect to teaching diverse religious and 
philosophical views (Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights) but did not violate the freedom of religion stipulated on Article 9 of the 
Convention.
24
   
In 2008, the Turkish Parliament passed a law lifting the Muslim veil ban, but the 
law was declared unconstitutional by the Turkish Constitutional Court for violating 
secularism (Steinvorth 2008, Ataman and Gottschlich 2008 )However, two years later, 
the Turkish Parliament passed another law lifting the ban. This time, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court did not challenge the law (Head 2010, Toksabay and Villelabeitia 
2010).  If the previous decisions of the ECHR are legitimate, then it remains to be seen 
whether lifting the ban will have adverse consequences for women and democracy in 
Turkey. 
 
Shifting interpretations of Muslim veiling in Turkey: From a Hybrid Model to Veil-
Friendly Legislation 
  In the past, both Turkey and the ECHR have interpreted very similarly the 
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freedoms for the sake of secularism. Yet, in recent years, Turkey‟s construal of 
“secularism” has evolved and changed along with the rise of Islamic forces in the 
country. Indeed, Turkey‟s interpretation of religious freedoms is tilting more closely 
towards the Arab interpretation of freedom of religion and human rights in general and 
showing an increasing gap with EU and other international agreements. It is expected that 
other veil-ban cases will be heard soon by the ECHR since laws banning full-faced veils 
have been recently implemented in some Western European countries. In contrast, recent 
adoption of veil-friendly legislation is challenging Turkey‟s more traditional 
interpretation of secularism.   Moreover, international and regional human rights 
agreements and Turkey‟s constitutional provisions are vague and make them susceptible 
to a variety of interpretations.  
The right to wear Muslim headscarves in public spaces is particularly vulnerable 
to ambiguous interpretations for several reasons. First of all, Muslim veiling represents a 
specific interpretation of Islam. Thus wearing Muslim veils is not just an expression of 
religious identity; it is an expression of a particular strand of religious identity. According 
to Western European interpretation of freedom of religion, everyone has the right to 
believe or not to believe; and the government guarantees secularism or a religious-free 
public space. In contrast, according to Islamic human rights, freedom of religion (as any 
other human right) should be based on Islamic law and should be interpreted as freedom 
to practice one‟s religion. Thus, religious minorities have a right to practice their own 
religions, but a religious-free public space is unconceivable.   
Second, European and Islamic human rights systems differ in how these rights 
may be limited in their application. European human rights allow for limitations on the 
freedom of religion if its exercise threatens “public order, health and morals” as well as 
the rights of others. Islamic human rights do not establish such limitations. Indeed, 
interpretation of human rights in Muslim countries is based on Islamic law, or left to 
Islamic legal scholars to construe them. According to European human rights law, “the 
others” might be broadly interpreted as various groups even within the religious 
community, thus recognizing its diversity and variety of practices associated with it. In 
contrast, according to Islamic human rights, “others” are religious minorities, thus they 
assume internal homogeneity of their religious communities and hence uniformity of 
religious practices.   
Turkey presents a very unique case when analyzed from these perspectives. Until 
recently, Turkish authorities interpreted freedom of religion in a hybrid manner. On the 
one hand, political authorities and state-court decisions supported banning veils for 
women in all public schools and universities, and interpreted freedom of religion, non-
discrimination and other individual rights more closely to the European model of 
secularism.  On the other, unlike the European model, religious teachings and “morality” 
in public schools are mandatory, according to Turkey‟s constitution, placing Turkey more 
closely to the “freedom of religion” as it is interpreted by Islamic human rights law. 
Thus, secularism was interpreted as a freedom to practice religion but under a tight 
control of the state.  However, with the advent to power of reformist Islamists under the 
leadership of the JDP, freedom of religion is going through a process of legal re-
interpretation, as a right to practice one‟s religion, and secularism is being re-invented as 
a social order which accommodates such freedoms.  Under this new interpretation, it is 
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practice his or her religion. Hence, Muslim veils are not viewed any longer as an obstacle 
to a secular order and have been allowed in public schools since 2010.  
As Turkey‟s interpretation of freedom of religion has shifted from an emphasis on 
individual rights and a religion-free secular order to collective rights and religion-friendly 
secularism, the question of whether the Turkish conceptualization of human rights in 
general is shifting closer towards the Islamic view is raised. Such changes may have 
important consequences not only for the rights of women whose interpretation of 
religious freedom does not involve wearing veils but also for the future of Turkey-EU 
relations, where Muslim veils are increasingly perceived as a symbolic association with 
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